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Unlike most other jurisdictions in Asia, Hong Kong began its corporate insolvency law reform 
efforts prior to the onset of the Asian financial crisis. Nevertheless, Hong Kong has yet to 
enact an effective statutory corporate rescue procedure. This article discusses the Hong Kong 
government's corporate rescue proposals currently under consideration and the emerging use 
of provisional liquidation to facilitate corporate rescue in Hong Kong. It concludes by recom- 
mending that the current proposals be scrapped and that a new bill be drafted that codifies 
the provisional liquidation corporate rescue procedures. 
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1. Introduction Basic Law or are amended by the legislature of 
On July 1, 1997, the British colony of Hong Kong 
became a Special Administrative Region of the 
People's Republic of China. The "one country, 
two systems" approach is embedded in the Basic 
Law (Hong Kong's new constitution). Article 8' 
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. 
Insolvency law reform efforts in Hong Kong 
began in 1990 when the Law Reform Com- 
mission of Hong Kong appointed the Sub- 
committee on Insolvency. The Sub-commit tee 
commenced work on November 12, 1990, and 
~rovides that the laws previously in force in Hang issued three consultative documents: one on per- 
Kong - ordinances, subordinate legislation, sonal bankruptcy (and voluntary arrangements) 
the common law, rules of equity, and custom- (1993) , 2  another on corporate rescue and insol- 
ary law -- continue to apply after the transition, vent trading (1995) ,3  and the third on corporate 
except to the extent that they contravene the liquidation (1998) .4 After consultation among 
*This article updates and revises the discussion of corporate rescue in "Recent Developments in Corporate and Cross- 
Border Insolvency Law in Hong Kong," a chapter appearing in Insolvency Risk Management: Standards and Strategies 
for the Next Decade (World Bank, forthcoming). I t  has its origins in conference papers delivered a t  the Academics 
Meeting at INSOL Las Vegas 2003 in Las Vegas, Nevada, on September 20, 2003, at  the International Bar Association 
Section on Business Law Conference in San Francisco, California, on September 18, 2003, and at  the World Bank 
Global Forum on Insolvency Risk Management Standards & Strategies for the Next Decade in Washington, DC, on 
January 28, 2003. 
' ~ a s i c  Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, Ch. 1, Art. 8, reprinted 
in Public Law and Human Rights - A Hong Kong Sourcebook, 85 (Andrew Byrnes & Johannes Chan, eds., 1993). 
2 ~ h e  Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong Sub-commit tee on Insolvency, Consultative Document on  Bankruptcy 
(August 1993). 
3 ~ h e  Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong Sub-committee on Insolvency, Consultation Paper on  Corporate Rescue 
and Insolvent Trading (June 1995). 
4 ~ h e  Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong Sub-committee on Insolvency, Consultation Paper on  the Winding-Up 
Provisions of the Companies Ordinance (April 1998), available at http://www. info.gov. hk/hlcreform/reports/index. htm. 
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interested professional bodies and others, each and the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, and 
of these consultative documents was followed they are known as the "Hang Kong Approach 
by a report of the Law Reform Commission, to Corporate Difficulties."lo 
on bankruptcy (1995) ,5 on corporate rescue and At present, the only available statutory 
insolvent trading (1996) ,6 and on corporate liqui- mechanism in H~~~ K~~~ to enable a company 
dation (1999).7 However, the area of the law in financial distress to restructure is a scheme of 
that has been amended is bankruptcy' arrangement pursuant to section 166 of the Com- 
The Bankruptcy (Amendment) Ordinance 1996 
panies Ordinance" (a replica of the UK scheme came into operation on July 1, 1998. 
of arrangement procedure). Complaints are fre- 
2. Provisional Supervision 
The most contentious area of law reform has 
involved corporate r e s c ~ e , ~  in great part because 
of opposition to many aspects of the govern- 
ment's proposals that differed from the earlier 
recommendations by both the Sub-committee 
on Insolvency and the Law Reform Commis- 
sion of Hong Kong. The government's second bill 
proposing a corporate rescue procedure, called 
"provisional supervision," was gazetted in May 
2001 as the Companies (Corporate Rescue) Bill 
2001 (the "2001  ill"),' but again ran into dif- 
ficulty because of its approach to resolving the 
issue of workers' rights (discussed below). 
The absence of an effective formal corpo- 
rate insolvency regime is the most striking defect 
in Hong Kong's insolvency regime. To address 
this problem, in April 1998 the Hong Kong 
Association of Banks issued guidelines for cor- 
porate restructuring in multi-bank situations, 
which are based on the well-known London 
Approach. In 1999, these guidelines were revised 
and extended in the form of joint guidelines 
issued by the Hong Kong Association of Banks 
quently raised about the section 166 procedures 
when used in relation to a corporate rescue (for 
which it was not specifically designed), includ- 
ing that schemes of arrangement tend to be com- 
plex and highly technical, require too many court 
hearings, and, unless conducted when a company 
is in provisional liquidation, do not benefit from a 
moratorium. In addition, there is no mechanism 
under section 166 for forcing unwilling secured 
creditors to come to the table to negotiate. 
In 1996, when the Law Reform Commission 
put forward its plans for the new provisional 
supervision regime, it was intended that provi- 
sional supervision would be a streamlined proce- 
dure with minimal court involvement, but with 
the crucial advantage of a moratorium. Unlike 
.the usual rules applicable in Hong Kong cor- 
porate liquidations, the moratorium would also 
apply to secured creditors.12 
Under the proposed scheme, a company 
would be able, without going to court, to appoint 
a suitably qualified professional (normally an 
account ant with extensive insolvency experi- 
ence) who would take over the management of 
the company and whose task it would be to 
5 ~ h e  Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong, Report on Bankruptcy (May 1995), available a t  < http://www.info. 
gov. hk/hlcreform/reports/index. htm> . 
 he Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong, Report on Corporate Rescue and Insolvent Trading (October 1996), 
available at  < http://www. info.gov. hk/hkreform/reports/index. htm>. 
7 ~ h e  Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong, Report on the Winding- Up Provisions of the Companies Ordinance (July 
1999), available at  < http://www. info. gov. hk/hkreform/reports/index. htm> . 
 his section incorporates and updates portions of Philip Smart & Charles Booth, Corporate Rescue: Hong Kong 
Developments, 10 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 41 (2002). For a more detailed discussion of provisional supervision, see 
Philip Smart and Charles D. Booth, Reforming Corporate Rescue Procedures in Hong Kong, J. Corp. L. Stud. 485 
(December 2001). 
  on^ Kong Government Gazette, Legal Supplement No. 3, C615 (May 18, 2001), available at  < htt,p://legco.gov. 
hk/yr00-01 /english/bills/c025-e.pd f> . 
1 ° ~ o n g  Kong Monetary Authority, Quarterly Bulletin (November 13, 1999), available at  < http://www.info.gov.hk/ 
hkma/eng/public/qb991 l/toc.ht m> . 
l l ~ o n g  Kong Companies Ordinance, Cap. 32, L.H.K., Sec. 166. 
l2 see Companies (Corporate Rescue) Bill 2001, Sec. 11. 
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ascertain whether a rescue plan was feasible. 
Each "major secured creditor" - defined as 
"the holder of a charge, whether fixed or oth- 
erwise, over the whole or substantially the whole 
of the company's property" -- is given a veto 
power over whether the provisional supervision 
should go forward.13 Once a major secured cred- 
itor consents to provisional supervision, it is also 
bound by the moratorium. l4 
Where the provisional supervision goes for- 
ward, a rescue proposal will be proposed to the 
creditors in due course. Approval requires pas- 
sage by a majority vote in number and of two- 
thirds in value of the creditors present and voting 
in one single class.15 (By contrast, to approve 
a scheme of arrangement, creditors will often 
be divided into several classes and the scheme 
must receive the approval of a majority in num- 
ber and three-quarters in value of each class 
of creditors, present and vot ing.16) To facilitate 
a provisional supervisor's attempts to rescue a 
company, the 2001 Bill (on the recommenda- 
tion of the Law Reform Commission) includes 
super-priority funding, so that where funds are 
provided as working capital by a lender after 
commencement of the provisional supervision, 
such debt would be given priority over all other 
debts (except for a fixed charge). l7 
The recommendations of the Law Reform 
Commission were first put forward in bill form 
in January 2000 in the Companies (Amendment) 
Bill 2000 (the "2000 ~i11") .I8 This bill, however, 
came under heavy criticism for a number of its 
proposals. The issue that attracted the most pub- 
lic debate was the way in which the bill dealt 
with wage and other claims owed to a company's 
workers. It proposed that a company would have 
to either pay, in full, all wages and other enti- 
tlements owing to the workers, or set up a trust 
account with sufficient funds at a bank, before the 
company could go into provisional supervision. 
This was not, however, what the Law Reform 
Commission had initially proposed. The Com- 
mission had hoped that the Protection of Wages 
on Insolvency Fund (the "PWIF" ), which is cur- 
rently available only when a company goes into 
compulsory liquidation, would be extended to 
cases of provisional supervision. lg 
The obvious question in relation to the 
2000 Bill was how a financially distressed com- 
pany might raise the cash necessary to pay 
(in advance and in full) all outstanding wages, 
severance payments, long-service payments, etc. 
Not surprisingly, many commentators saw the 
requirement of having to pay the workers in 
full as an enormous limitation on the utility 
of provisional supervision.20 Unfortunately, how- 
ever, the 2001 Bill does not improve upon this 
position. The latest bill provides that no provi- 
sional supervision may commence until the com- 
pany has paid off in full (or set up a trust 
account with a licensed bank, containing suffi- 
cient funds to pay off in full): (a) all wage claims 
owed to its employees; and (b) all entitlements 
arising under the Employment Ordinance (e.g., 
severance payments) owed to its "former employ- 
ees". 21 Moreover, the term "former employees'' 
is widely defined. It includes not only workers 
who have already been laid off, but also workers 
whose employment will be terminated on or after 
131d., Sec. 19(5)(a) and Sec. 19(5)(b) regarding a holder of two or more charges. 
141d., SW. 11. 
151d., schedule 7, para 15. 
16see supra n. 11. 
17Companies (Corporate Rescue) Bill 2001, supra n. 9, Sec. 18. 
1 8 ~ o n g  Kong Government Gazette, Legal Supplement No. 3, C5 (January 7, 2000). 
l g ~ h e  government objected to using the PWIF for provisional supervision for fear that the fund would become a resource 
for corporate bailouts and eventually go bust. Ironically, the fund became insolvent anyway, and in October 2002 was 
rescued with the commitment by the Hong Kong government to extend to  the PWIF a HK$695 million bridging loan 
between 2002-2003 and 2005-2006. 
2 0 ~ e e ,  e.g., Philip Smart and Charles D. Booth, Provisional Supervision and Workers7 Wages: An Alternative Proposal, 
31 H.K. L. J. 188-199 (2001). 
2 1 ~ e e  Companies (Corporate Rescue) Bill 2001, supra n. 9, schedule 2, para. 3(d). 
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commencement of the provisional supervision. 22 
For example, if a company intends to go into 
provisional supervision and then lays off half its 
workers as part of a restructuring, the company 
will have to calculate and pay, in advance, not 
only the wages it owes to all its employees, but 
also any severance payments that will become 
due once the lay-offs are put into effect. There 
can be no doubt but that the treatment of work- 
ers' entitlements under the 2001 Bill would act as 
a major obstacle to many companies that might 
otherwise seek to go into provisional supervision. 
This fact has been repeatedly pointed out to the 
Hong Kong government. 
In 2002, it appeared that a possible com- 
promise might be in the offing. In December 
2001, the Bills Committee of the Legislative 
Council suspended its deliberations on the 2001 
Bill pending further consultations. In September 
2002, the Secretary for Financial Services and 
the Treasury circulated a Consultation Paper on 
Proposals Relating to the Trust Account Arrange- 
ment under the Companies (Corporate Rescue) 
Bill (the "Consult ation Paper" ) .23 The consul- 
tation period ended on November 8, 2003. The 
Consultation Paper proposed that instead of a 
company having to pay off its workers in full in 
advance (or having to set up a trust account in 
that amount), a limit or ceiling would be put on 
the amount that would have to be set aside by the 
company (or put in the trust account) before the 
company could go into provisional supervision. 
This limit would be calculated by reference to the 
amounts payable by the PWIF when a company 
goes into compulsory liquidation -- for exam- 
ple, the overall cap for workers whose employ- 
ment is terminated before the corporate rescue 
procedure starts would be HK$278,500 (roughly 
~ ~ $ 3 6 , 0 0 0 )  .24 However, little progress has been 
made since the consultation period ended in late 
2003, and the bill is not any closer to being 
enacted. 
In theory, the 2001 Bill should have sev- 
eral advantages over the guidelines set by the 
Hong Kong Association of Banks and the Hong 
Kong Monetary The bill applies 
to all creditors, not just banks, and has statu- 
tory force - a holdout creditor will have no 
option but to fall in line with everyone else 
in a provisional supervision (unless, as a major 
secured creditor, it has a veto). (In contrast, 
the recent Hong Kong Court of Appeal deci- 
sion in Credit Lyonnais v S K  Global Hong Kong 
~ t d . ~ ~  discusses the nonbinding nature of the 
Hong Kong Approach to Corporate Difficulties.) 
In practice, however, it is likely that lenders, 
as well as companies themselves, will continue 
to favor an informal workout wherever possi- 
ble. The appointment of a provisional supervi- 
sor -- an independent third party supposedly 
looking after the interests of all the creditors - 
may be a bitter pill for the directors of a finan- 
cially troubled company to swallow and, at the 
same time, may lessen the direct iniluence of a 
lender on any re-structuring plan. Nor should 
it be overlooked that most Hong Kong corpo- 
rations (even those listed on the stock market) 
are family controlled: the perceived concern is 
that the family may be particularly unwilling 
to hand over control to an outside restructuring 
specialist. 
3. Provisional Liquidation 
Another recent development relating to corpo- 
rate rescue is that the Hong Kong judiciary 
has shown creativity and flexibility in using 
provisional liquidation procedures to facilitate 
corporate rescue. Provisional liquidation is nor- 
mally an interim period during which the assets 
22 ~ d .  
2 3 ~ e e  <http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr0001/english/bc/bcl2/papers/bcl2cb1-2463-le.pdf>. 
2 4 ~ p  to HK$36,00O for wages for services rendered within four months prior to the last day of service; up to HK$22,500 
or one month's wages, whichever is the lesser, for wages in lieu of notice; and up to HK$220,000 for severance payment, 
for a total of HK$278,500. 
2 5 ~ e e  supra n. 10. 
26[2003] HKCA 250. Credit Lyonnais v SK Global Hong Kong Ltd. and other Hong Kong cases discussed in Part 3, 
infra, may be found at  http://www.hklii.org/. 
Corporate Reorganization i n  Hong Kong 187 
of a company are protected while the court 4. Conclusion 
considers the merits of making a winding-up 
order. However, in Re Keyview Technology (B VI) 
Ltd. ( "Ke yuiew ") ,27 the provisional liquidators 
secured the agreement of all of the company's 
creditors to a restructuring proposal and then 
applied to the court for an extension of their 
normal powers and for permission to participate 
in the restructuring. The Hong Kong court held 
that it had the power to extend the provisional 
liquidators' powers and made the requested 
order .28 
Since Keyview, the number of provisional liq- 
uidations in Hong Kong being used as a means 
of corporate rescue has dramatically increased. 
Moreover, the holding of Keyuiew has been 
extended by the courts in Luen Cheong Tai 
International Holdings ~ t d .  ,29 Re I- China Hold- 
ings ~ t d . , ~ '  and Re Fujian Group ~ t d . , ~ '  which 
all have recognized "the facilitation of corporate 
rescue as a rationale for appointing provisional 
liquidators in the first place." Other recent cases 
in which provisional liquidation has been used 
to assist in a corporate rescue include Re Jinro 
(HK) International ~ t d . ~ ~  (to participate in a 
group-wide restructuring) and the recent appli- 
cation by SK Global Hong Kong Ltd. to prevent a 
creditor from levying execution against the com- 
pany's assets.33 
It is clear that provisional liquidation pro- 
vides important benefits to  parties trying to 
restructure a debtor. It puts a moratorium in 
place and also enables some benefit to be gained 
from valuable corporate assets. The Hong Kong 
courts' liberal approach to this new use of pro- 
visional liquidation has led to the creation of a 
more formal corporate rescue mechanism that 
can be utilized when an out-of-court workout 
proves to be impossible. 
In 2002, legal pundits were betting against the 
enactment of the 2001 Bill; after the consulta- 
tion process ended in late 2003 it appeared that 
the mood was gradually shifting in favor of enact- 
ment. However, the process has recently stalled 
and now enactment is again looking unlikely. 
Over the years I have supported the enactment of 
the 2001 Bill, albeit with the cap -- from the per- 
spective that provisional supervision was "better 
than nothingv 34 and that enactment was "better 
late than never."35 However, I now think that 
it is time to reconsider this position. It seems 
that the window of opportunity for enacting pro- 
visional supervision has closed. The bill does not 
have a high priority within the government and 
has not gained support among bankers or insol- 
vency practitioners. In the interim, provisional 
liquidation has emerged as a useful corporate res- 
cue tool and the Hong Kong judiciary is proving 
receptive to its use. Even if provisional supervi- 
sion were to be enacted with a cap on payments 
to workers, it is likely that corporate debtors and 
bankers would prefer to use the less complicated 
and less expensive provisional liquidation proce- 
dure that does not require pre-petition payments 
to workers. 
The time has come to scrap the provisional 
supervision proposals and to rethink the law 
reform process. The starting point should be 
the recent provisional liquidat ions being used 
to facilitate corporate rescues. The Law Reform 
Commission of Hong Kong should reconstitute 
the Sub-committee on Insolvency, which should 
study these liquidations and the orders made 
therein with a view to drafting amendments codi- 
fying the provisional liquidation corporate rescue 
process. For example, an amendment should be 
27[2002] 2 HKLRD 290. 
2 8 ~ o r  further discussion of provisional liquidation, see Hong Kong Corporate Insolvency Manual 143-44 (Philip Smart, 
Charles D. Booth, and Stephen Briscoe, eds., H.K.S.A. 2002). 
29[2002] 3 HKLRD 610, appeal dismissed, [2004] HKCA 5. 
30 [2002] HKCFI 1357. 
31 [2003] HKCFI 36. 
32[2003] HKCFI 649, which led to the sanctioning of a scheme of arrangement in [2004] HKCFI 673. 
3 3 ~ h e  application was made in response to the decision noted in supra n. 26. 
3 4 ~ m a r t  & Booth, Corporate Rescue: Hong Kong Developments, supra 8, at 45. 
3 5 ~ o o t h ,  Recent Developments in Corporate and Cross-Border Insolvency Law in Hong Kong, supra n. *.  
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made to the Companies Ordinance to set out 
standard powers for provisional liquidators.36 At 
present, these powers are set out in the order 
appointing a provisional liquidator .37 Another 
amendment should require that any proposal put 
to creditors in a provisional liquidation corpo- 
rate rescue must contain a provision requiring 
the payment in full (in a lump sum upon the 
plan coming into effect) of all workers' claims 
that in the absence of such a plan would be sat- 
isfied from the PWIF. A corresponding amend- 
ment should be made to the Protection of Wages 
on Insolvency ~ r d i n a n c e . ~ ~  Workers should be 
treated the same regardless of whether a com- 
pany is liquidated or restr~ctured.~' 
The codification of the provisional liquida- 
tion corporate rescue would most likely be wel- 
comed by bankers and insolvency practitioners, 
prove useful to corporate debtors, and lead to 
more certainty and transparency in the corporate 
rescue process. The enactment of a more com- 
prehensive corporate rescue procedure would be 
even better, but given the slow pace of insolvency 
law reform in Hong Kong that seems unlikely for 
many years to come. At this stage, the best solu- 
tion for Hong Kong would be to promptly cod- 
ify the provisional liquidation corporate rescue 
procedures. 
3 6 ~ h e  Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong made this recommendation in its July 1999 Report. See supra n. 7 ,  at 57. 
37~ompanies Ordinance, Sec. 193(3). But see Companies Ordinance, Sec. 194(1A) & Sec. 199(4)-(5) (codifying the 
powers for provisional liquidators appointed by the Official Receiver in small-asset cases where the Official Receiver is 
of the view that the assets are not likely to exceed HK$200,000 in value). 
3 8 ~ a p .  380, L.H.K. 
3 9 ~ e e  Smart & Booth, Reforming Corporate Rescue Procedures in Hong Kong, supra n. 8, at  497; Smart & Booth, 
Provisional Supervision and Workers' Wages: An Alternative Proposal, supra n. 20. 
